Attackers a re becoming pro ficient at revers e engineering sec ur ity patches and then crea t ing worm s or viruses that rapidly a t tack syste ms that have not a pplied t he pa tches. Automated patch ma nagement syste ms are being develop ed to add ress t his threa t. A cent ral function of a pa tch man agem en t system is to decid e which patches to install on a computer a nd to determine t he seq ue nce of actions t hat will ca use t he m to be install ed .
INTRODUCTION
Security patches have become the primary technique far closing softwar e vuln erabilities that are discovered afte r software systems have been deployed . Unfartunately, securi ty pat ches also reveal details of the underlying vulnerabilities. At tackers ar e becoming proficient at using t his information to create worms or viru ses that rapidly attack systems t hat have not applied t he patches.
Several pat ch man agement systems (e.g., MicrosoftjSMS [9] , Radia Patch Manager [10] , etc.) have been developed to combat t his threat . T hese systems include features from sophisticated software version man-agement, software configuration management , and (p ost-deployment) software maintenance man agement systems [2, 5] . Software version , configuration, and maintenance management systems are designed to assist software develop ers in developing, composing, and maintaining large, evolving software syste ms . They provide features such as storage of multiple versions of a softwa re package, retrieval of any identified version, t rac king changes to a version , and notifying users affected by a change. Patch management systems extend t his functi onality by including sophi sticated syste m inventory modules that determine t he cur rent st ate of a compute r system , configuration management modules t hat compute patches t hat may be installed on a sys te m, and secure patch deploym ent modules that deploy and install t he patches in a secure manner [3, 4] .
However, while patch management systems such as Microsoft/SMS provide numerous sophisticated capa bilit ies, they st ill expect human administrators to make crit ical decisions regarding which patches to inst all. In particular, they only support coars e-grained patch management policies, e.g., vendors may mark cert ain patches as being crit ical, and ad minist rators may designate certain patch sets as being referen ce configurations. However , no suppo rt is provided to represent the relative desirability of patches, or to help an administrator decide which patch sets to design ate as prefer red configur ations, or for end-users to express t heir policy requirements regarding security patches (especially regarding patches which are not "recommended" or "critical") . For instan ce, a user may wish to specify t hat a certain application is critical and takes pr ecedence over non-cri tical secur ity patches which conflict with t he application.
A second problem arises when a computer has not been main tain ed in an up-to-date patched state. In t his case, when an ad minist rat or seeks to update t he configurat ion, he mus t install numerous patches in order to take t he compute r to a recommended configuration . For instance, Sun Solaris 8 cur rent ly has 113 secur ity patches of which 81 are in the Recommended Patch List. An administrator must first select some subset of these patches as the t arget configur at ion and the pat ch management syst em will then install the patches sequentially (the syste m will manage all dep endencies and conflicts ). However , since th e pat ches are installed sequent ially, the computer may pass through st ates t hat are insecure. T his te mpora ry vulnerability is important since t he patch management system migh t fail or be suspended while the system is in t he vulnerable state. Thus, the sequence of patch inst allations should be selected to minimize such vulnera ble states, and t he adm inist rator should be informed of any potenti al vulnera bilities.
In summary, existing patch management systems do not answer two questions that are important to the security administrator of an individual computer: (1) What is the most desirable set of patches that should be installed on a computer? (2) What sequence of patch installation and removal actions will provide a safe transition path to the desired state? In this paper, we present an abstract model and practical algorithms that answer these questions for heterogeneous, distributed computers. We use a preference relation to model the relative desirability of patches. We define and build a patch remediation graph which permits us to analyze properties of patch installation sequences, e.g., whether a sequence includes vulnerable states. Note that since most subsets of patches are valid configuration states, the number of states and the number of possible patch installation sequences is enormous (i.e., the size of the remediation graph is exponential in the number of patches) . Hence, we rcly on model checking to manage the state explosion problem. We emphasize here that we do not address the practical problems of system inventory analysis, patch deployment and installation, etc. in this paper as these functions are present in current patch management products. Rather, we focus on the novel problem of remediation analysis as expressed by the previous two questions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an abstract model for patch configuration management while Section 3 presents algorithms for patch remediation. Section 4 compares our approach with related work. Section 5 concludes this paper.
SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT:

MODEL
Several models of software configuration management exist. Version models [2J label each distinct version of a software product and relate the different versions using labeling conventions or graphs. Change models model a software product in terms of a single base version and aseries of changes (e.g ., software patches). Hybrid models include attributes of both version models and change models. However, these models do not typically guide system administrators in selecting appropriate versions and changing a system's state from one version to another. In this section, we present an abstract security patch management model that permits a security administrator to reason about the desirability of possible patch configurations and to determine how to transition a system securely from one configuration to a preferable configuration.
Security Patch Management
We model the patch configuration state of a system in terms of a baseline configuration and a set of changes (e.g., security patches) . We represent changes by a set of patches rather than a sequence of patch installation and removal actions; however , our model and algorithms can be generalized to handle patch sequences.
If ß is a finite set of baseline system configurations, and P is a finite set of security patches, then 8 = B x 2 P is the set of all possible patch configuration states. If p is a patch and s = (b, P) is astate, then we will write p E 8 to denote that pEP.
Let T~8 x 8 be astate transition relation. T represents the state change caused by installing or uninstalling a single security patch. Patch installation is often state-dependent, e.g., a patch may only be installed in states in which a specific version of an application is installed while certain other patches are not installed.
A patch action graph G = (8, T) is a finite directed graph whose vertices are the patch configuration states in 8 and whose directed edges are given by T. We say that astate 8' is reachable from state 8 if there is a directed path in G from 8 to 8'. Security patches typically have consistency constraints, e.g., two patches conflict with each other and must never be installed together in the same state, or one patch must always be installed together with another. We represent these in terms of a consistency predicate V~8, i.e., V defines the set of consistent states.
Due to the consistency constraints, it is not possible to reach the most secure state simply by installing all available patches. Rather, an administrator must make a choice regarding which subset of patches to install. We represent this choice using a preference relation <C 8 x 8 which is a quasi order over 8, i.e., < is irreflexive and transitive.
Informally, patch remediation is the process of transitioning a system from an initial state to a preferred, consistent state by performing a sequence of patch actions. We will present an algorithm to compute consistent states that are reachable from a given initial state and are maximal under x , We elaborate on this in the remainder of this section.
Patch Configuration States
There are several well-described inventory tools that collect inforrnation regarding the baseline software products installed on a computer as weIl as the patches that have been installed thus far. These tools are specific to a computer's operating system. For instance, tools for Windows-based systems may determine configurations by examining the Windows Registry of each system. Tools for Unix-based systems may determine which applications are currently installed by using one of several techniques. One technique is to compute hashes of all executable files in certain directories and to compare those hashes with the standard hashes published by software vendors. Another technique is to look for patterns in audit records and to compare those patterns with standard patterns caused by the presence of an application.
Popular operating systems do not maintain adequate information to precisely define a specific patch configuration state. In particular, operating systems do not typically maintain the entire sequence of patch installs and uninstalls from the base version of an application. Rather, they only maintain a set of all patches currently installed on the computer. Hence, in this paper we model a computer's state as a set of patches, together with a baseline configuration that includes all the software products installed on the computer.
Patch State Consistency
Consistency constraints for patch states are properties that states must satisfy in order to be compliant with operational security policy. They can be defined in terms of the following three predicates on patch states:
This specifies that the patch P must be installed in 
Patch State Transitions
Astate transition represents the state change caused by installing or uninstalling a single security patch. Patches are specified as being applicable only to systems with a specific baseline configuration installed and a set of prerequisite patches already installed. Several patches also require the absence of conflicting patches. Astate transition relation is specified as a set of rules. Each rule is a ground instantiation of one of the following rule templates with b* being a sequence of baseline configurations, p* and q* being sequences of patches, and r being a patch. We write r.p* to denote the sequence whose first element is rand whose remaining elements are those in p*. Each rule has a condition and a body. If the state satisfies the condition, then the rule is applicable and has the effect of either adding or removing the patch r from the state's patch set. The condition has three clauses. For astate s = (b, P) to satisfy the condition, its baseline configuration b must be in b*, all patches in p* must be in P, and the patches in q" must not be in P. Note that the remove-patch rule also requires the patch r to be installed in the state. The state transition relation T is given by the union of all specified rules.
Patch Preference Relation
A preference relation <~8 x 8 is a quasi order (i.e., an irreflexive and transitive) relation between configuration states that represents the "desirability" of configurations. Preferences may be provided by software vendors (e.g., when a vendor recommends that certain patches be installed), by security administrators (e.g., when an administrator recommends that certain patches not be installed due to site-specific conflicts), or by end-users (e.g., when a user specifies that it is not desirable to install patches that conflict with mission-critical applications). s') ). This construct is used to compose multiple quasi orders in order to construct a single preference relation.
Remediation
We can now define what we mean by patch remediation. DEFINITION 
SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT: ALGORITHMS
We now present an algorithm for the computation of the remediation relation of aposture, for a given initial state. Let (5, V, T, <) be aposture, R be the induced remediation relation, and So be an initial, possibly inconsistent, state. We want to compute all states Sn such that R(so, sn); we also want to compute the transition paths from So to Sn' The states Sn are our goal states; they are consistent states that are reachable from So and are preferable to So.
Since the transition relation can both add and delete patches and since it is sensitive to the absence and presence of patches, a simple statespace search for goal states will run into the state explosion problem in real-world systems. Hence, we consider an algorithm based on model checking. Model checking [1J is a technique for checking whether a formal model of a system satisfies a given property. A model, in our case, is a patch action graph. If a model does satisfy a specified property, then a model checker will return true; otherwise it will return a counterexample, i.e., a transition path that violates the property. Hence, we use a safety Trg, 80, Ve) . 1\80 < 8) ). This expresses the property that it is not possible to reach a consistent state that is preferable to 80. Model checking will return all states reachable from 80 for which this property is false. That is, it will return all states 8 such that 8 is reachable from 80 and a goal state is reachable from 8; it will also return a transition path from 80 to each 8. Sheyner et al [14J have described the use of model checking to construct attack graphs that represent all possible attacks on a networked system. We can adapt their algorithm to construct aremediation graph, i.e., a graph that depicts ways in which a system can be patched so that the system eventually reaches consistent states that are preferable to the initial state. DEFINITION Goal states are defined to be all consistent states that are reachable from 80 and are preferable to 80 . The algorithm (see Figure 1 ) first uses a model checker to compute the set 8 1' g of all states that are reachable from the initial state and that have a path to a goal state. It then restricts the patch action graph to the states in 8 1' g ; the resulting graph is the remediation graph. As in [14] , there are efficient BDD algorithms for all the operations used in this algorithm.
We can show that the patch remediation graph is exhaustive and succinct [14J:
LEMMA 6 1 Figure 2 shows how to compute the set VMG of goal states that are maximal under <.
The transition relation of the remediation graph provides the transition paths from the initial state to the maximal goal states. These can be used by any patch management system to deploy and install the selected patches. For instance, we have implemented similar algorithms within the Outpost System [8] that was developed at MITRE.
Note that aremediation graph can be analyzed furt her, e.g., to select safe transition paths that never traverse states that are less preferable than the initial state, or to determine the periods during remediation that a system may become vulnerable to attacks. Such analysis can help a security administrator reason about the implications of various defensive actions available to the administrator.
RELATED WORK
Several researchers have used model checkers to perform vulnerability analysis of computer networks. Ritchey and Ammann [13] , Jha et al. [7, 6] , and Sheyner et al. [14J use model checkers to generate attack paths (or attack graphs) by which an attacker can use known at tacks to compromise a networked computer system. Our approach is based on this body of work; however, we apply those techniques to a completely different problem, namely the problem of security patch reme-diation. Further, we propose the new, novel concept of aremediation graph which represents all possible paths by whieh adefender can elose vulnerabilities in a system. Ramakrishnan and Sekar [11, 12] use a model checker to discover individual vulnerabilities on single hosts. While our approach is also host-based, we do not discover individual patches but rather use a model checker to discover patch installation sequences to goal states.
Patch management systems such as MierosoftjSMS [9] and Radia Patch Manager [10] include modules that cornpute patch installation sequences that satisfy patch dependencies and constraints. We extend this capability with a patch preference relation that models the relative desirability of patches and applications. Further, we also build patch remediation graphs that enable us to compute maximal goal configuration states and perform analyses such as finding safe patch installation sequences.
CONCLUSION
The main contribution of this paper is the automatie generation of patch remediation graphs. We presented language constructs for specifying patch consistency constraints, patch action rules, and user preferences for patch configurations. We showed how a model checker can be used to construct patch remediation graphs by generating counterexamples to a safety property. The graphs permit us to compute maximal goal states that represent the preferred final states for patch remediation. The graphs also give us the sequence of patch actions (patch installs and uninstalls) that would transition the systems to the desired final states. Finally, the graphs permit us to reason about properties of the transition paths, e.g., whether the system enters some vulnerable states during the remediation process.
Future work ineludes combining the model with a trust management model. With this, patch policy assertions (patch dependencies, constraints, preferences, etc.) would be represented as credentials. A delegation model would provide a flexible and powerful framework for handling patch management in a distributed and heterogeneous environment. We are also examining whether remediation graphs may be used to handle other security configuration management tasks.
